Voting as a Signaling Device

In this paper, citizens vote in order to influence the election outcome and in order to signal their unobserved characteristics to others. The model is one of rational voting and generates the following predictions: (i) The paradox of not voting does not arise, because the benefit of voting does not vanish with population size. (ii) Turnout in elections is positively related to the importance of social interactions. (iii) Voting may exhibit bandwagon effects and small changes in the electoral incentives may generate large changes in turnout due to signaling effects. (iv) Signaling incentives increase the sensitivity of turnout to voting incentives in communities with low opportunity cost of social interaction, while the opposite is true for communities with high cost of social interaction. Therefore, the model predicts less volatile turnout for the latter type of communities

Interspecific introgression mediates adaptation to whole genome duplication

Adaptive gene flow is a consequential phenomenon across all kingdoms. While recognition is increasing, examples lack of bidirectional gene flow mediating adaptations at loci that manage core processes. We previously discovered concerted molecular changes among interacting members of meiotic machinery controlling crossover number upon adaptation to whole genome duplication (WGD) in Arabidopsis arenosa. Here we conduct a population genomic study to test the hypothesis that adaptation to WGD has been mediated by adaptive gene flow between A. arenosa and A. lyrata. We find that A. lyrata underwent WGD more recently than A. arenosa, suggesting that pre-adapted alleles have rescued nascent A. lyrata, but we also detect gene flow in the opposite direction at functionally interacting loci under the most extreme levels of selection. These data indicate that bidirectional gene flow allowed for survival after WGD and that the merger of these species is greater than the sum of their parts

Experimental evidence that quorum rules discourage turnout and promote election boycotts

Many democratic decision making institutions involve quorum rules. Such rules are commonly motivated by concerns about the “legitimacy” or “representativeness” of decisions reached when only a subset of eligible voters participates. A prominent example of this can be found in the context of direct democracy mechanisms, such as referenda and initiatives. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate the consequences of the two most common types of quorum rules: a participation quorum and an approval quorum. We find that both types of quora lead to lower participation rates, dramatically increasing the likelihood of full-fledged electoral boycotts on the part of those who endorse the Status Quo. This discouraging effect is significantly larger under a participation quorum than under an approval quorum.This work was carried out within the funding with the UID/ECO/03182/2013 reference with the FCT/MEC’s financial support through national funding and when applicable co-funded by the FEDER under the PT2020 Partnership Agreement